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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

March 1, 1975

Re:

No. 73-1462 - White v. Regester

Dear Chief:
My tentative vote in this case is to
affirm with respect to Jefferson, McLennan,
Tarrant and Galveston Counties and to reverse
with respect to Lubbock, El Paso and Nueces.
Also, perhaps there should be a remand as to
Travis County.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to Conference
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March 3, 1975

No. 73-1462

White v. Regester

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE :

In accord with the suggestion at Friday's Conference,
I have prepared this memorandum on the question of our
jurisdiction. Under § 1253 this depends, of course, on
whether this was a case "required • • • to be heard and
determined by a district court of three judges."
On the first appeal, White v. Regester, 413 U.S. 755,
we held that the original case was one requiring three judges
because the plaintiffs had sought an injunction against the
statewide redistricting plan on the ground of impermissible
population variances. Although the District Court had granted
only declaratory relief on the statewide issue, we had
appellate jurisdiction because the court had granted an
injunction against the multimember districts in Dallas and
Bexar counties. Because the court's order therefore was
literally one granting an injunction in a case required to
be heard by three judges, our jurisdiction was established
and the opinion did not inquire whether the challenge to
multimember districts by itself would have required a threejudge court.
Following our reversal on the statewide redistricting
issue, the plaintiffs (joined by intervenors) resumed their
quest
_ for an injunction against the nine remaining multimember districts on the ground that each diluted the voting
strength of minorities. No other issue was left in the case.
The prayer for injunctive relief would require a three-judge
court under § 2281 only if it was an attack on a statute of
statewide
application •
......__
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Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97, held that a state statute
providing a distr1ct1ng scheme for the selection of members
of a county governing body was not a statute of statewide
application for purposes of § 2281, despite the existence of
similar statutes applying to other counties. Id. at 102.
Companion cases decided with Moody are consistent in principle.
In Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105, the Court
held that a Michigan statute prescribing a uniform method
of selection for all county school boards was a statute of
statewide application. But in Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112,
the Court held that a statute prescribing the method of
selecting the county governing board for Princess Anne
County, Virginia, was not a statute of statewide application.
Board of Regents v. New Left Education Project, 404 U.S.
541, extended Moodt v. Flowers to cover rules issued by a
state-level body a fecting more than one locality within the
State. Because the Board of Regents of the University of
Texas system governed only a few of the state's college
campuses, the Court held that its rules were not rules of
statewide application even though the affected campuses were
located in different parts of the state. In a footnote the
Court distinguished a summary affirmance finding jurisdiction
in Alabama State Teachers Assn. v. Alabama Public School and
College Authority, 393 U.S. 400, saying that although the
"legislative direction" in that case directly tapplied only
to the issuance of bonds for one college in Alabama, it was
expressive of an official statewide policy of maintaining a
racially identifiable, dual system of higher education.
I believe Moody and New Left furnish the basis for
holding that this case was not one required to be heard by
three judges. The state statute at issue, reproduced in the
Juris. Stmt. Appx. at 113B-146B, makes separate provision for
each legislative district. There was no uniform policy of
using multimember districts in all urban areas: for example,
the Redistricting Board created single-member districts in
Harris County (Houston), the most populous county in the state.
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, establishes beyond question
that the use of multimember districts is not phr ~ unconstitutional. Consequently, the plaintiffs' claim t at these
districts minimize the voting strength of minorities must
stand or fall on facts peculiar to each district. The record
in this case demonstrates how intensely local and varied
these facts can be.

- 3 -

Arguably this case can be distinguished from Moody v.
Flowers, by the fact that it involves the members of state
legislature rather than of a local governing body. The
state at large undoubtedly has more interest in the selection
of members of its state legislature than it has in the
selection of local officers, but the nature of its interest
is different from that motivating the three-judge requirement. A decree invalidating one or more multimember districts
does not frustrate statewide policy to the extent that may
occur when a federal court declares a state regulatory statute
unconstitutional. The effect is local, especially if (as
I believe) the court's decree must be limited to prospective
relief. The decree would notUMeat any legislators or
invalidate any action of the current legislature; it would
simply change the method of choosing legislators within a
particular district at future elections. That it involves
several districts rather than only one is irrelevant under
New Left, at least as long as there is no uniform state policy
such as that in Alabama State Teachers Assn., which would
be nullified by a decree against any one of the districts.
For me, at leas~ a further reason for holding that
three judges were not required in this case is the difficulty
this Court will have in making an intelligent appellate review
of factual issues which are essentially local and often turn
on subjective ~udgments (e.g. whether legislators have been
appropriately 'responsiverr to minority group needs). This
is quite unlike the usual three-judge case in which the
central issue is rarely so fact-specific. Deciding that
these cases must be taken in the usual manner would be
consistent, I think, with the policy of minimizing our
responsibility for first-line appellate review.
Nor do I think such a ruling in this case would foreshadow a similar result in a redistricting case. A suit
challenging reapportionment on grounds of impermissible
population variance is different from this case, both in
theory and practical effect, from a suit challenging multimember districts on a claim of discrimination against minorities.
The issue in a Baker v. Carr suit is whether one or more
districts are over-represented (or under-represented) by
comparison t o other districts within the state. Even if
only one district is off the norm, the alleged discrimination is statewide. Any relief granted to the plaintiff must
affect more districts than one. A challenge to a multimember

- 4 district, however, is essentially local. I believe, therefore,
an opinion could be written in this case that would not alter
the usual course of proceeding by three-judge courts in cases
that allege impermissible population variance among districts.
For these reasons, I adhere to the view that the proper
disposition of the case is to vacate the judgment and remand
for entry of a fresh decree so t hat the parties can take an
appeal to CAS •

t .1 if.
L. F .P., Jr.
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JUS TI CE PO T T E R S TEWA RT

March 4, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re: No. 73-1462 - White v. Regester
I agree with Lewis that the proper disposition of this
case is to vacate the judgment and remand to the district
court for entry of a fresh decree so that there can be a timely
appeal to the court of appeals. Lewis, in his memorandum of I
today, has stated my reasons for that view better than I could
have done, and I have nothing to add.
If I reached the merits in this case, which I do not
expect to do, my tentative views would coincide with those
expressed by Byron. That is, I would tentatively affirm with
respect to Jefferson, McLennan, Tarrant, and Galves ton
Counties, and to reverse with respect to Lubbock, El Paso,
and Nueces Counties, with a possibility of remand as to Travis
County.

7)
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

March 5, 1975

Re:

No. 73-1462

-

White v. Regester

Dear Chief:
I definitely feel that we have jurisdiction in this case, and
I would dissent from a holding that we do not.
On the merits, I am still inclined to adhere to my vote at
Conference, that is, to affirm. With respect to one or two of the
districts, my feeling is not so firm that I would dissent if a majority
is inclined to reverse.

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference
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CHAM BERS Of"

JUS T I CE WM . J . B R E NNAN, JR .

RE:

May 21, 1975

No. 73-1462 White v. Regester

Dear Byron:
If your Memorandum becomes the Court
opinion, will you please add the attached
at the foot thereof.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White
cc. The Conference

/

RE:

No. 73-1462

White v. Regester

Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join Part I of the Court's opinion and concur in
the affirmance of the judgment of the three-judge court
as respects Tarrant, Jefferson and Galveston counties.

I

dissent however from the reversal of the judgment with respect to Nueces County and the vacation of the judgment
with respect to El Paso, Travis, Lubbock and McLennan
counties.

I do not think that our ability to appraise the

factual circumstances with respect to those counties can
possibly equal the informed approach that the three-judge
court brought to .the

int~icacies

of the respective situa-

tions, political and otherwise, in the several counties.
We ought accept the judgment of the three-judge court as we did as respects Dallas and Bexar counties in Regester I,
and as we do today as respects Tarrant, Jefferson and Galveston counties - as a "blend of history and an intensely local
appraisal of the design and impact of the . . • multi-member
district [of each county] in the light of past and present
reality, political and otherwise."

Regester I, at 769-770.

I would affirm the judgment of the three-judge court in its
entirety.
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CHAMBERS O F

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

May 21, 1975

No. 73-1462 - White v. Regester
Dear Byron,
In view of the telegram from
Regester's counsel, I agree that we should
not waste any more time on this case, at
least for now. Unfortunately, it was your
time that was wasted -- in the preparation
of your very thorough memorandum.
Perhaps, as Felix Frankfurter used to say,
you can now put the memorandum in a
letter to a friend.
Sincerely yours,

( /<)I
I • -

~/

Mr. Justice White

.

Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

May 21, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 73-1462 - White v. Regester

Mike Rodak has just given me the following memorandum
and I suggest we not waste any more time on the matter:
"From Austin, Texas, and signed by David R.
Richards, attorney for Regester, et al.
"This wire is to confirm our telephone conversation of this date concerning White v. Regester,
No. 73-1462. It would appear that the subject
matter of this litigation will be shortly
rendered moot. The Texas House of Representatives has adopted legislation creating single
member legislative districts for all counties
involved in this litigation. The bill is to be
considered by the Texas Senate on Friday and
will be presumably adopted and there is every
reason to believe that the bill will be signed
by the Governor before the legislature adjourns
June 2, thereby eliminating all remaining multimember legislative districts in Texas."

May 22, 1975

No. 73-1462

White v. Regester

Dear Byron:
I also have a memorandum in the New Jersey Lottery case
which I am saving to send "to a friend".
Connniserations.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

RECEIVED
JIJN 1 t> 197 5

LAW OFFI C ES OF

DON·GLADDEN
702

UUUK

DUHNKTT

BUILUINO

FORT WORTH. TEXAS 76102

OffiCE Of HIE. C\J.Ri\

~rJ.~r. u.~

817·83iHI637

DON GLADD E N
MARVIN COLLINS
ART BRENDER

June 13, 1975

Honorable :Hichael Rodak, Clerk
Supreme Court of the United States
·1 First Street, N. E.
Washington, D. C.
20543
RE:

/

White vs. Regester
No. 73-1462

Dear Mr. Rodak:
We have received a copy of Mr. David Richards letter of
June 12, 1975, directed to . you relative to the above case.
It would appear that the difference of view between the
attorneys for other parties plaintiff and our office is one perhaps
of semantics rather than law. It is our position that the constitutional question in the litigation is whether or not the various
plaintiffs have been denied equal access to the political processes,
rather than the means by which such denial is accomplished. We
feel that the action taken by the Texas Legislature may not have
resolved the issue and render moot the question in the case.
We realize that if Governor Briscoe signs HB 1097 or fails to
veto it by June 22, 1975, that the facts before the Supreme Court
are not sufficient to determine whether or not the new districts
created by the legislature resolve the complaint of the parties
plaintiff.

I

In any event we do concur that upon HB 1097 becoming law the
Supreme Court should remand the case back to the district court for
further proceedings.
I am forwarding a copy of this letter to all counsel of record.
Very truly yours,

~~
DOH GLADDEU
DG:cls
cc:

All Counsel of record

LAW
SAM HOU STON CLINTON, JR .
DAVID R. RICHARD S

OFFICES

CLINTON & RICHARDS

AR EA C ODE 5 1 2
4 76 ·4822

600 WEST 7TH STREET ,

AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701

June 12, 19 75

JUN 13 1~l7S
Hon. Michael Rodak, Clerk
Supreme Court of the United States
1 First Street, N.E.
Washington, D. C. 20543
RE:

OFfiCE OF THE CLeRK
ts!JPREME COU:n, U.0.

White v. Regester
No. 73-1462

Dear Mr. Rodak:
This letter is to confirm the contents of our telephone
conversation of this date regarding the current status
of legislative reapportionment by the Texas Legislature.
I am enclosing a copy of House Bill 1097 in the form
which i t passed the Texas Legislature and now awaits
the Governor's signature. You will note that the bill
passed tbe House on May 7 by a vote of 103 yeas and 29
nays and passed the Texas Senate on May 28, 1975, by a
vote of 30 yeas and 1 nay. This bill, along with many
others passed in the closing days of the Texas Legislature, are awaiting th'e Governor's . signature.
Under
the terms of Article 4 Section 14 of the constitution
of tile State of Texas the Governor has 20 days from the
date of adjournment to act upon the legislation. The
Legislature adjourned June 2 and the Governor must act
by June 22, 1975. Thus the Governor must either sign
the bill or veto it before June 22 or i t will become law
on June 22.
From a purely practical point of view there is absolutely
no reason to think that the Governor will veto House Bill
1097.
It passed overwhelmingly in both houses of the
Legislature and there has been no expressed opposition
to the bill becoming law.
Governor Briscoe has been in
attendance at the Governor's Conference in New Orleans
for much of the time since the Legislature adjourned and
House Bill 1097, along with a number of other bills, await
his signature, presumably next week.
By its terms House Bill 1097 creates single member legislative districts in each of the counties under consideration,

· ~·

Hon. Michael Rodak, Clerk
Supreme Court of the United States
June 12, 19 75
Page Two

to wit:
Jefferson, Galveston, Tarrant, McLennan, Travis,
Nueces, Hidalgo, El Paso and Lubbock, and there are no remaining multi-member legislative districts.
Furthermore, Section 5 of the bill specifically supersedes
the Legislative Redistricting Act of the Legislative Redistricting Board of Texas.
It was, of course, the Act of the
Legislative Redistricting Board of Texas which has been the
subject matter of this litigation from the outset.
It is the unanimous view of the attorneys associated in the
brief on behalf of the Plaintiffs Regester, Moreno, Chapman,
Wright and Warren that this action of the Legislature renders
moot the questions in the case as i t now pends before the
United States Supreme Court. We recognize that this view is
apparently not shared by Mr. Gladden who represents the
Plaintiff Escalante.
If it is not presumptuous, we suggest that i t would seem
appropriate to follow the practice employed in Diffenderfer v.
Cehtral Baptist Church of Miami, 404 U.S. 412 (1972) and vacate
the judgment of the district court and remand to the district
cour~ - to ·permit any Plaintiffs, who chose, to amend their
pleadings, if any chose to attack the newly enacted legislation.
In all events, i t is our vie\v that the matter has been
rendered moot by legislative action, and that final confirmation of this mootness will be forthcoming upon the Governor's
signing House Bill 1097.
In this connection I will notify
you immediately upon any action being taken by the Governor
in connection with House Bill 1097.
As indicated below copies of this communication are going to
all counsel of record.

DRR:CSH
Enclosure

Hon. Michael Rodak, Clerk
Supreme Court of the United States
June 12, 19 75
Page Three

CC:

Ms. Elizabeth Levatino, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General of Texas
Supreme Court Building
Austin, Texas 78701
Mr. Charles E. Williams, III
NAACr Legal Defense Fund
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10017
Philip Crawford, Esq.
1606 East 12th
Austin, Texas 78762
Oscar Mauzy, Esq.
Suite 200
8204 Elmbrook Dr.
Dallas, Texas 75247
R. James George, Jr., Esq.
Austin National Bank Building
- ~ustin, Texas 78701
Sant'ord J. Rosen, Esq.
Director of Litigation, MALDEF
145 Ninth Street
San Francisco, California 94103
George Korbel, Esq.
EEOC Litigation Center
Room 902
536 South Clark
Chicago, Illinois 60605
Don Gladden, Esq.
702 Burk Burnett Building
Fort Worth, Texas 76101
Albert H. Kauffman, Esq.
MALDEF
501 Petroleum-Commerce Building
201 North St. Mary's Street
San Antonio, Texas 78205
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE
I

,

June 17, 1975

/

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 73-1462 - White v. Regester
The attached letters represent the extent

of the current information with respect to this
case.

,fJ

L B.R.W.
Attachments:

Ltr of June 12, 1975,
fr Clinton & Richards
Ltr of June 13, 1975,
fr Don Gladden, Esquire

June 20, 1975

Ho. 73-1462

White v. Regester

Dear Byron:
'.

Please join me ill your circulation of Juae 20.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White

lfp/88
cc:

The Coilference

-
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

June 20, 1975

Dear Byron:
Please join me in your circulation of June 20th.
Sincerely,

[,/VV'

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference

~~

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

Re:

7 3-1462 - White v. Re2:e ster

Dear Byron:
I agree with your proposed per curiam of
today 1 s date.

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 20, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re:

No. 73-1462 - \\7hite v. Regester

This case had been argued and a memorandum giving my
views was circulating when we were informed that the Texas
Legislature had passed a new apportionment statute creating
single-member districts in each of the counties at issue
before us.

That bill is now before the governor and he has

until June 22 to sign or veto.

I assume that the bill will

become law, and on that assumption the question arises as to
the disposition of this case.
In pursuit of this question, I should first say that
I have been advised by my law clerk, the Library and the
Department of Justice that Texas is not subject to § 5 of
the Voting Rights Act.
on the contrary

As you know, I had been proceeding

assumption~

(Texas is covered in the pro-

posed 1975 extension of the Act.)

---

The problem is thus considerably simplified but not
wholly solved.

-----------

Section 2 of the new apportionment statute

states as follows:

-2"This Act shall become effective kor the
primary and general, for al~ representatives from the places herein specified and
describ ed to the 65th Legislature, and continue
in effect thereafter fo r succeeding legislatures; provided sp ecifically that this Act shall
not affect the membership, personnel, or districts
of the 64th Legislature; and provided further,
that in case a vacancy occurs in the office of any
representative of the 64th Legislature by death,
resigna tion, or otherwise, and a special election
to fill such vacancy becomes necessary, said election shall be held in the district as it was constituted on January 1, 1975."
el~ctions,

The Act also provides in § 5 as follows:
"When this Act becomes effective, the Act of
October 22, 1971, of the Legislative Redistricting
Board of Texas apportioning the state into representative districts, as altered by decision of the
United States District Court, Western District of
Texas, is superseded."
There will not be legislative elections in Texas until 1976,
and under the foregoing provision the old districts will be
effective· until those elections take place.

Section 2

expressly provides that special elections to fill vacancies
will be held in the districts "as constituted on January 1,

--

1975."

---------------

Whether this reference is to the districts ordered

into effect by the District Court, as § 5 arguably would
indicate, I do not know.
In any event, I would let the District Court deal
first with the impact of the new Act.
per curiam would suffice:

Perhaps the following

-3-

"Per curiam.
"We are informed that the State of Texas
h as adopted new apportionment legislation providing sing l e -member districts to replace the
multimember districts which are at issue before
us in thi s case. That statute by its terms does
not become effective until the 1976 elections,
and intervening special elections to fill vacancies, if any, will be held in the districts
involved as constituted on January 1, 1975.
Rather than render an unnecessary judgment on the
validity of the constitutional views expressed by
the District Court in this case, which we do not
undertake to do at this time, we vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the case to
that court for reconsideration in light of the
recent Texas reapportionment legislation and for
dismissal if the case is or becomes moot.
So ordered."

.'

Mr . Jv··u~~ce
·. ·
Stewart

~- '-{ ') 'w
~.a elf;
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Hr. Justice Marshall
.t..rr. Justice BlacJ:mun
~ Justice Pow~ll
~~. Justice Rehnquist

From: White, J.

1

Circulated:

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA~ rculated:
No. 73-1462
Mark White et al.,
Appellants,

v.
Diana Regester et al.

On Appeal from the United States
District Court for the Western
District of Texas.

[June -, 1975]
PER CuRIAM.

We are informed that the State of Texas has adopted
new apportionment legislation providing single-member
districts to replace the multimember districts which are
at issue before us in this case. That statute by its terms
does not become effective until the 1976 elections, and
intervening special elections to fill vacancies, if any, will
be held in the districts involved as constituted on January 1, 1975. Rather than render an unnecessary judgment on the validity of the constitutional views
expressed by the District Court in this case, which we
do not undertake to do at this time, we vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the case to that
court for reconsideration in light of the recent Texas
reapportionment legislation and for dismissal if the case·
is or becomes moot.
So ordered.
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CHAMBE "'S OF"

THE CH I EF JUSTICE

Re:

June 2 3, 1975

7 3-1462 - White v . Regester

Dear Byron:
I join your per curiam circulated today.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Wli te
Copies to the Conference
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